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ABSTRACT: This paper has two aims. The first is to use contemporary discussions of nave realist 
theories of perception to offer an interpretation of Merleau-PontyÕs theory of perception. The second is to 
use consideration of Merleau-PontyÕs theory of perception to outline a distinctive version of a nave realist 
theory of perception. In a Merleau-Pontian spirit, these two aims are inter-dependent.  
 
Merleau-PontyÕs aim in the Phenomenology of Perception is to argue that we are embodied 
subjects, embedded in the world. This account of beings-in-the-world is intended to 
overcome two pervasive distinctions: between Empiricism and Intellectualism on the one 
hand, and between Subject and Object on the other.  
Merleau-PontyÕs account of embodied subjectivity attempts to steer a middle way 
between the extremes of Empiricism and Intellectualism. Empiricists, like psychologists 
and philosophical naturalists, attempt to explain subjects and subjectivity in purely causal 
terms. Intellectualists, by contrast, treat subjects as either non-physical entities that co-
exist with purely physical objects (as Descartes and Cartesians suggest), or else as 
acosmic transcendental EgosÑor as Merleau-Ponty often refers to them, Ôconstituting 
consciousnessesÕÑthat exist outside of physical space and time (as Kant and post-
Kantian Idealists suggest).  
Merleau-PontyÕs account of embodied subjects as essentially embedded, meanwhile, 
attempts to dissolve the sharp distinction between conscious subjects and physical 
objects. From an ontological point of view, perceiving subjects are not immaterial, and 
objects are not merely physical; rather, perceiving subjects are bodily subjects, and the 
things that appear to us in perceptual experience are Ôburdened with anthropological 
predicatesÕ (PP 334). From a phenomenological point of view, self-awareness through 
the Ôbody schemaÕ already implies awareness of our environment. We are not aware of 
ourselves in merely ÔpositionalÕ spatial terms: that is, as one object amongst others 
located in objective space. Rather our awareness of ourselves involves a kind of 
Ôsituational spatialityÕ. We are aware of ourselves as body-subjects through being aware of 
the ÔmilieuÕ in which we situated, and the possibilities for action that this milieu affords 
(PP 102); as such, Merleau-Ponty argues that Ôthe Òbody schemaÓ is, in the end, a manner 
of expressing that my body is in and toward the worldÕ (PP 103). This account of our 
nature as embodied, embedded subjects in turn grounds Merleau-PontyÕs theory of 
perception: as he says in the Introduction to Part II of Phenomenology of Perception, having 
outlined his account of the body in Part I, ÔThe theory of the body is already a theory of 
perceptionÕ (PP 209). 
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 A number of recent discussions of Merleau-Ponty in the Anglophone tradition 
have drawn comparisons to contemporary debates about enactive theories of perception 
(e.g. No 2006), whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (e.g. 
Kelly 2001, Carman 2008: 220-3), and the kind of disjunctivist theory of perception 
defended by McDowell (e.g. Jensen 2013, Berendzen 2013). This paper explores a 
different comparison: that between Merleau-PontyÕs theory of perception and 
contemporary nave realist theories of perception.1  
Whereas Merleau-PontyÕs philosophical project is, in part, a reaction to Kantian 
and post-Kantian Idealism as it manifested itself primarily in France and Germany, 
contemporary nave realist theories of perception have their roots in the response of 
Oxford Realists like Cook Wilson, Pritchard, and Austin to predominantly British 
manifestations of post-Kantian Idealism in the later nineteenth century (cf. Kalderon and 
Travis 2013). Contemporary nave realist theories of perception are philosophical 
theories of perception, and as such embody substantive philosophical claims. Nave 
realist theories of perception not a natural kind, and come in a variety of different forms, 
however they commonly embody a commitment to some or all of the following 
theoretical claims. First, perceptual experiences are essentially relational, in the sense that 
they are constituted in part by those things in the perceiverÕs environment that they are 
experiences of. Second, the relational nature of perceptual experience cannot be 
explained in terms of perceptual experiences having representational content that is veridical 
if the things in the subjectÕs environment are as they are represented as being, and non-
veridical otherwise. Third, the claim that perceptual experiences are essentially relational 
articulates the distinctive phenomenological character of perceptual experience, or Ôwhat 
it is likeÕ for a subject to have an experience. Fourth, given that veridical perceptual 
experiences are essentially relational, they differ in kind to non-veridical experiences such 
as hallucinations. Fifth, perceptual experiences are relations to specifically mind-independent 
objects, properties, and relations: things whose nature and existence are constitutively 
independent of the psychological responses of perceiving subjects.  
The following sections consider these claims in turn. In ¤¤1-4, I argue that 
Merleau-Ponty can be understood as endorsing interesting versions of the first four 
claims associated with contemporary nave realism, and to this extent accepts something 
like a nave realist theory of perception. In ¤5, I argue that the comparison with nave 
realism breaks down insofar as Merleau-PontyÕs theory of perception, at least in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, appears to be broadly idealistic in a way that contemporary 
forms of nave realism tend not to be. I conclude by highlighting a further meta-
philosophical difference between Merleau-PontyÕs approach and that of contemporary 
nave realists, which points to the possibility of a view that I call transcendental nave realism. 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), Fish (2009), Brewer (2011), 
Logue (2012), and Soteriou (2013).  
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1. Relationality  
According to the nave realist, perceptual experiences are essentially relational. The 
essential relationality of experience is to be understood in a particularly strong sense: on 
this view, perceptual experiences are constituted, at least in part, by the thingsÑobjects, 
properties, relationsÑin a subjectÕs environment that they are experiences of. The claim 
that perceptual experiences are essentially relational in this way has modal consequences: 
a particular experience could not have occurred if the subject had not been perceptually 
related to precisely those elements of the environment. It follows that if there is nothing 
of the appropriate kind in the subjectÕs environment that the subject is related to, then 
there is no perceptual experienceÑeven if it seems to the subject that there is.  
Nave realist theories of perception contrast in this respect with theories of 
perception according to which perceptual experiences are essentially relational, but 
according to which they involve standing in a relation to something other than things in 
the subjectÕs environmentÑas, for instance, on sense-datum theories of perception, 
where perceptual experiences involve ÔdirectÕ awareness of sense-data (e.g. Price 1932).2 
Nave realist theories of perception also contrast in this respect with theories of 
perception according to which perceptual experiences are not essentially relational: for 
instance, adverbialist theories of perception, according to which perceptual experiences 
are Ôadverbial modificationsÕ of conscious subjects (e.g. Ducasse 1942); and standard 
forms of intentionalism (or representationalism), according to which perceptual 
experiences represent things in the subjectÕs environment as being a certain way, and are 
veridical if the things in the subjectÕs environment are the way that they are represented 
as being, and non-veridical otherwise (see e.g. Crane 2009). On all of these views, how 
things are with the subject is constitutively independent (at least on a particular occasion) 
of how things are in the subjectÕs environment: it is possible for the subject to have 
exactly the same kind of experience whether or not the environment is as it is perceived 
to be. 
Merleau-Ponty accepts that perceptual experience is relational in the strong sense 
accepted by nave realists. According to Merleau-Ponty, ÔseeÕÑand ÔperceiveÕ more 
generallyÑare what Ryle (1949) would call Ôsuccess wordsÕ. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, ÔIf 
I see an ashtray in the full sense of the word ÒseeÓ, then there must be an ashtray over thereÕ 
(PP 393).  
It is possible to accept that ÔseeÕ (Ôin the full sense of the wordÕ) is a success term, 
but nevertheless deny that perceptual experiences are essentially relational: for instance, if 
ÔseeÕ and ÔperceiveÕ can only be truly applied in cases where there is a psychological event 
that is common to the ÔgoodÕ case of veridical perception and the ÔbadÕ cases of illusion 
                                                
2 Some sense-datum theorists sought to argue that sense-data Ôbelong toÕ things in the environment, 
however, even so understood sense data are necessarily distinct from material objects, to allow that 
veridical and non-veridical experiences form a common kind. 
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and hallucination, and where this psychological event meets further non-psychological 
conditions, such as being caused in the appropriate way. But this is not Merleau-PontyÕs 
view.  
The context of this remark is a discussion (and rejection) of the Cartesian claim 
that the mind is better known than the body. For Descartes, even if a doubt can be raised 
about the nature and existence of the external world that a perceptual experience is an 
experience of, we can at least be certain of the nature and occurrence of the experience 
itself qua mental phenomenon. As Descartes puts it: 
 
I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I 
certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called Ôhaving a 
sensory perceptionÕ is strictly just this (1642: 19).  
 
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, insists that ÔPerception and the perceived necessarily have 
the same existential modalityÕ (PP 393); this is to say that if I am perceiving, then 
necessarily what I am perceiving exists. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no psychological 
event of Ôhaving a sensory perceptionÕ that is independent of the way things are in the 
subjectÕs environment, and so which is common to the ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ cases. To 
suppose otherwise, he thinks, would be to think of vision Ôas the contemplation of a 
drifting and anchorless qualeÕ, rather than an awareness of qualities of particular objects, 
where this awareness of qualities of particular objects Ôpresupposes our opening onto a 
real or onto a worldÕ (PP 393). If there is no object of the appropriate kind in the 
subjectÕs environment, there is simply no perception: 
 
if I raise a doubt as to the presence of the thing, this doubt bears upon vision itself; if there 
is no red or blue over there, then I say that I have not really seen them (PP 393; see further ¤4 
below). 
  
The relational nature of Merleau-PontyÕs account of perceptual experience is 
reflected in his account of the relationship between sensing subjects and sensible objects. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the sensing and the sensible are:  
 
not opposite each other like two external terms, and sensation does not consist of the 
sensible invading the sensing beingÉIn this exchange between the subject of sensation and 
the sensible, it cannot be said that one acts while the other suffers the action, nor that one 
gives sense to the other (PP 221-2).  
 
To say that the sensing and the sensible are Ônot opposite each other like two external 
termsÕ is to say that they are not radically different types of entity, that are only 
contingently related, for instance, via efficient causal relations. Objects do not cause 
sensations in perceiving subjects, as on Empiricist views. Nor is it the case that conscious 
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subjects ÔconstituteÕ sensible objects, as transcendental idealist forms of Intellectualism 
maintain. Rather, Ôsensation is, literally, a communionÕ (PP 219) or ÔcoexistenceÕ (PP 221) 
between sensing and sensible. That is, sensory experience does not merely ÔsymbolizeÕ, or 
represent, sensible objects, as on Protestant interpretations of communion in which the 
bread and wine merely symbolize the body and blood of Christ (PP 219). Rather sensing 
bodies Ôtake upÕ sensible objects in experience; there is, when we are suitably Ôgeared intoÕ 
the world, a Ôcoupling of our body with the thingsÕ (PP 334). As such, sensible objects 
become present to sensing subjects in something like the way that orthodox Catholicism 
holds that God is really present in the bread and wine during communionÑat least to 
those whose are appropriately receptive (PP 219). 
The Eucharistic analogy is not meant to suggest that sensing subjects take on the 
attributes of the sensible; they do not themselves become, in any sense, coloured or 
shaped. This is not a form of adverbialism, according to which perceptual experiences 
are conscious modifications of perceiving subjects that can be differently adverbially 
modified: it is not, for example, that in the presence of a red square, a subject will 
perceive redly and squarely. Adverbialism assumes a strict separation of sensing subjects 
and sensible objects that Merleau-Ponty is at pains to deny.  
For Merleau-Ponty, the relationship between sensing and sensible is much closer: 
there is an intertwining of the sensing and the sensible in perception.3 The sensible 
provides a Ôvague solicitationÕ that Ôposes to my body a sort of confused problemÕ (PP 
222). The sensible can then be explored by my ÔgazeÕ: the ÔmechanismÕ which mediates 
between appearances and bodily behaviour, and so which allows us to respond our 
environmentÕs solicitations Ôgiven their senseÕ (PP 323). But I am able to explore the 
sensible environment ÔonlyÉin response to its solicitationÕ (PP 222). All this is made 
possible by my openness to the world through the senses, which obtains in virtue of my 
embodied existence:  
 
To say that I have a visual field means that I have an access and an opening to a system of 
visible beings through my position, and that they are available to my gaze in virtue of a kind 
of primordial contract and by a gift of nature, without any effort on my part. In other 
words, it means that vision is pre-personal (PP 224).  
 
As the analogy with communion suggests, Merleau-Ponty thinks that there is 
something mysterious, even miraculous, about perceptual experience: ÔOne can say, if 
you like, that the relation of the thing perceived to perceptionÉis a magical relation in 
nave consciousnessÕ (SB 189). To this extent, Merleau-PontyÕs account of the 
relationship between sensing and sensible is reminiscent of RussellÕs (disparaging) 
                                                
3 Although Merleau-Ponty emphasises that this co-existence with objects does not amount to a perfect 
coincidence of subject and object in perception: perception is perspectival, and we never fully grasp the object 
that we commune with (e.g. PP 69-74, 224). 
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description of his (earlier) conception of knowledge by acquaintance as involving 
Ôsomething like a mystic union of knower and knownÕ (1921: 234).  
 
2. Representational Content 
Proponents of nave realist theories of perception can be described as accepting a form 
of Ôaustere relationalismÕ to the extent that they hold that perceptual experiences consist 
most fundamentally in the obtaining of a certain kind of relation between subjects and 
objectsÑa relation that is something like RussellÕs (1910) non-propositional relation of 
acquaintance. On this view, perceptual experiences are not essentially representational: 
there is no essential, non-derivative, sense in which our perceptual experiences represent 
the environment as being a certain way. Rather, the attitudesÑtypically judgmentsÑthat 
perceivers adopt towards what is presented in perception are constitutively distinct from 
perceptual experiences themselves; at best, perceptual experiences have representational 
content only derivatively or non-essentially, in virtue of the content of distinct attitudes 
towards what the subject is acquainted with in experience. This, for instance, is the 
import of TravisÕs claims that the senses are ÔsilentÕ: 
 
rather than representing anything as so, our senses merely bring our surroundings into view; 
afford us some sort of awareness of them. It is then up to us to make of what is in our view 
what we can, or do (Travis 2004: 64) 
 
Austere relationalist forms of nave realism contrast with standard intentionalist 
theories of perception in this respect. According to standard intentionalist theories of 
perception, perceptual experiences are representational events or states that are 
individuated, at least in part, by their intentional or representational content. This 
content is itself determined by accuracy or correctness conditions: conditions that specify 
how things must be in the subjectÕs environment if the experience is veridical. 
The claim that perceptual experiences are essentially relational does not suffice to 
distinguish nave realism from all forms of intentionalism. Some intentionalists insist that 
there is a sense in which perceptual experience is essentially relational, because perceptual 
experience essentially involves representational content that needs to be relationally 
individuated: for instance, because it involves object-dependent demonstrative content 
such as this is F (e.g. McDowell 1994), or it involves potentially gappy representational 
contents consisting of de re modes of presentation of particular objects and properties 
(e.g. Schellenberg 2011). Whilst it can become difficult to see exactly what is stake 
between nave realists and intentionalists of this kind, the debate can be understood as a 
disagreement about what explains the relational nature of perception. Intentionalists of 
this kind will typically seek to explain the obtaining of a relation between perceivers and 
their environment in terms of the way their environment is represented as being; indeed, 
they will typically insist that the obtaining of the perceptual relation simply consists in 
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experience representing the world in the particular way it does. As McDowell, for 
instance, puts it: 
 
it is precisely by virtue of having content as they do that perceptual experiences put us in 
such relations to things (2013: 144). 
 
Intentionalists who individuate the content of experience relationally differ in this respect 
from nave realists. According to nave realists, the obtaining of the perceptual relation is 
distinct from, and standardly more basic than, the intentional attitudes that we can adopt 
towards that which we are perceptually related to. As Soteriou, for instance, remarks:  
 
the claim that the relevant psychological relation is non-representational should be 
understood in terms of the idea that the obtaining of the relation is not simply determined 
by the obtaining of a mental state that has an intentional content with veridicality 
conditionsÑirrespective of whether the mental state in question is a factive one, and 
irrespective of whether the content of the state is object-involving (2013: 107; see also 
Brewer 2011: 131). 
 
One way of interpreting Merleau-PontyÑthe Ôovercomer of distinctionsÕÑis as 
suggesting a middle-way between the extremes of austere relationalism and 
intentionalism. Merleau-Ponty is hostile to views according to which perception involves 
ÔrepresentationÕ. As he says considering the perception of three-dimensional objects from 
a particular point of view, for example: 
 
Should we say, as psychologists often have done, that I represent to myself the sides of this 
lamp which are not seen? If I say these sides are representations, I imply that they are not 
grasped as actually existing; because what is represented is not here before us, I do not 
actually perceive it (PrP 13; see also PP lxxiii-lxxiv, SB 224).  
 
Of itself this doesnÕt necessarily mean that he rejects an intentionalist theory of 
perception. Merleau-Ponty typically means by ÔrepresentationÕ something intellectual, that 
is voluntary and involves the application of concepts: what Husserl calls Ôact 
intentionalityÕ (PP lxxxii; cf. e.g. PP 247). By contrast, Merleau-Ponty emphasises that 
there is a distinct kind of Ôoperative intentionalityÕ that underlies thought and judgment; 
as he puts it in ÔThe Primacy of PerceptionÕ, perceptual experience is Ôan original 
modality of consciousnessÕ (PrP 12). This might in turn be thought to suggest a 
commitment to an intentionalist theory of perception according to which the content of 
perceptual experience is non-conceptual. But this may also be too quick. As Merleau-
Ponty notes, although intentionality is often cited as Ôthe principal discoveryÕ of the 
phenomenological movement, the basic claim that Ôall consciousness is consciousness of 
somethingÕ is widely accepted (PP lxxxiii). It was accepted, for instance, by Kant, albeit in 
an overly intellectualist form. In a different way, it is also something accepted by nave 
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realists, for whom the intentionality, or ÔaboutnessÕ, of perceptual experience is to be 
explained by the fact that perceptual experiences consist in the obtaining of a conscious 
relation of acquaintance to things in our environment. For the nave realist, our 
perceptual experiences are ÔaboutÕ (ÔofÕ, or Ôdirected atÕ) those things in our environment 
that we are consciously acquainted with. Given the relational nature of acquaintance, 
there can be no conscious acquaintance without an object of acquaintance, and hence the 
nave realist too can accept that Ôall consciousness is consciousness of somethingÕ. We 
therefore cannot conclude simply from the fact that Merleau-Ponty thinks that 
perceptual experiences are intentional in the sense of exhibiting ÔaboutnessÕÑthat Ôall 
consciousness is consciousness of somethingÕÑthat they are intentional in the sense of 
being fundamentally representational states or events that are individuated by their 
representational content, non-conceptual or otherwise.4 
 An alternative way of interpreting Merleau-Ponty is as claiming that perceptual 
experience consists essentially but not exclusively in the obtaining of a relation of 
acquaintance between subjects and objects. Merleau-Ponty agrees with the relationalist 
that openness to the world is necessary for perceptual experience: as Merleau-Ponty says, 
the world of objects is Ôavailable to my gaze in virtue of a kind of primordial contract and 
by a gift of nature, without any effort required on my partÕ (PP 224). However, 
acquaintance with the world of objects is not of itself sufficient for perceptual 
experience. Perceptual experience itself also essentially involves taking things to be a 
certain wayÑthat is, it also involves a kind of representational content. And this, in turn, 
involves the operation of the gaze, the mechanism that allows us to explore and 
interrogate our environment. Mere openness to the world without the operation of the 
gaze is not sufficient for perception. According to Merleau-Ponty, for instance, the 
dimension of ÔDepth is born before my gaze because my gaze attempts to see somethingÕ 
(PP 274), and so Ôpassive vision with no gaze, such as the case of a dazzling lightÉdoes 
not display an objective space before usÕ (PP 329). As such, vision Ôis only inwardly 
prepared for by my primordial opening to a field of transcendencesÕ but Ôis accomplished 
and fulfilled in the thing seenÕ (PP 395). Given that we cannot perceive without the 
operation of the gaze, and it is by means of the gaze that we take the world to be a 
certain way, perceptual experience essentially involves taking the world to be a certain 
wayÑthat is, it essentially involves a certain kind of content. In keeping with Merleau-
PontyÕs anti-Intellectualism, the additional ÔtakingÕ that is partially constitutive of 
perceptual experience is not an intellectual judgment, but rather a form of Ôbodily 
understandingÕ:  
 
                                                
4 See e.g. Siewert (2016) for different ways of understanding ÔintentionalityÕ: for instance, being ÔaboutÕ (ÔofÕ 
or Ôdirected atÕ) an object; being about (of, or directed at) a possibly non-existent object; having accuracy 
conditions (or conditions of satisfaction more generally); and having representation content. Although 
these different ways of understanding ÔintentionalityÕ are often run together, to say that experiences are 
intentional in one sense need be to say that they are intentional in another.  
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a thing is not actually given in perception, it is inwardly taken up by us, reconstituted and 
lived by us insofar as it is linked to a world whose fundamental structures we carry within 
ourselves and of which this thing is just one of several possible concretions (PP 341). 
 
Merleau-PontyÕs view therefore potentially differs from that of austere relationalists twice 
over: first, in claiming that perceptual experience consists essentially but not exclusively 
in the obtaining of a relation of acquaintance; and second, in claiming that the attitudes 
that we adopt towards the world are not primarily belief-like propositional attitudes, but 
consist instead in a kind of bodily understanding.  
Perceptual experience so understood is not a two-stage process. Nor are our 
openness to the world and our ability to explore it via the gaze and thereby take it to be a 
certain way distinct aspects of experience that can be understood independently of each 
other. We can think of this as a providing a twist on one interpretation of the Kantian 
thesis that Ôintuitions without concepts are blindÕ. On this interpretation, intuition is a 
kind of non-propositional relation of acquaintance, and the twist is that this acquaintance 
relation is blind, not without concepts, but without bodily understanding.5 This is not 
simply a form of intentionalism according to which the content of experience is non-
conceptual, because the obtaining of the acquaintance relation in perception is not itself 
to be explained in terms of the way that the environment is taken (in a bodily way) to be; 
rather openness to the world, and exploration of it via the gaze, is what makes possible 
taking the environment to be a certain way. In this respect, Merleau-Ponty accepts a core 
commitment of contemporary nave realism. But nor is this simply austerely relationalist 
form of nave realism, because the openness to the world is not itself more fundamental 
than our ability to take it to be a certain way: to be open to the world is for the world to 
be available for exploration by the gaze, and so available to be taken a certain way; and 
we cannot understand what it is to be open to the world such that it is not open to 
exploration by the gaze, and not available to be taken up by us. In a characteristically 
Merleau-Pontian fashion, these two aspects of perceptual experience are inter-
dependent.6  
 
3. Phenomenology 
I have argued so far that Merleau-Ponty agrees with the nave realist that perceptual 
experiences are essentially relational, and that the relationality of experience cannot be 
explained exclusively in terms of our experience representing the environment as being a 
                                                
5 For interpretations of Kantian intuition as a form of acquaintance, see Allais (2015), McLear (2016), and 
Gomes (2017).  
6 If a core commitment of nave realism is the denial that perceptual experiences have representational 
content essentially, then Merleau-PontyÕs hybrid position is not a form of nave realism; it is at best a Ônave 
realist-likeÕ theory. Assuming some flexibility in what the core commitments of nave realism are, then 
Merleau-PontyÕs positions counts as a form of nave realism insofar he accepts that the intentional content 
of experience is not explanatorily more basic than its relationality. For slightly different forms of hybrid 
theory, see e.g. Soteriou (2013) and Logue (2014). 
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certain wayÑalthough I have suggested that he offers a distinctive, hybrid, account of 
the relationship between acquaintance and (bodily) representational content that differs 
from that standardly provided by nave realists, by insisting that perceptual experiences 
are essentially but not exclusively relational. But why should we accept that perceptual 
experience is essentially relational?  
A common line of argument for contemporary nave realist theories of 
perception is that they best explain and articulate the phenomenological character of 
veridical perceptual experience, or in less technical terms, Ôwhat it is likeÕ to be a subject 
of experience. My aim in this section is show that Merleau-Ponty presents a distinctive 
version of this line of argument.  
One widely discussed aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experience is the 
Ôtransparency of experienceÕ. As G.E. Moore famously remarks:  
 
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element 
is as if it were diaphanous (1903: 25). 
 
The claim that perceptual experience is transparent can be understood as the conjunction 
of a positive and a negative claim (cf. Martin 2002). The positive claim is that when we 
reflect on perceptual experience, we are aware of environmental objects, properties, and 
relations. The negative claim is that when we reflect on experience we are not aware of 
any mental objects (such as sense-data or images), or any qualitative properties of the 
experience itself (sensations or qualia).   
 Merleau-Ponty accepts both the positive and negative claims. On the positive 
side, Merleau-Ponty insists that we perceive both objects and their properties. So, for 
instance:  
 
When I perceive a thing such as a fireplace, it is not the concordance of its various 
appearances that leads me to believe in the existence of the fireplace as the geometrical plan 
and common signification of all of these perspectives. On the contrary, I perceive the thing 
in its own clarity (PP 191). 
 
Just as we perceive objects, and not merely their appearances, Merleau-Ponty insists that 
we perceive the constant properties of objects, too: we perceive their size, form, colour, 
sound, temperature, and weight, and not merely the appearances they present from 
particular perspectives (PP 312-328). Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, we perceive the 
constant properties of things because we perceive the objects that they are properties of, 
and we perceive both because, more fundamentally, we are open to the world:  
 
The constancy of colour is merely an abstract moment of the constancy of things, and the 
constancy of things is established upon the primordial consciousness of the world as the 
horizon of all our experiences (PP 326). 
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 On the negative side, Merleau-Ponty insists that we are not aware of any mental 
objects or qualitative properties of experience. As he says in his earlier work, The Structure 
of Behaviour, we not perceptually aware of any mental objects distinct from the things 
themselves: 
 
it is the thing itself which nave consciousness thinks it is reaching, and not some inner 
double, some subjective reproduction. It does not imagine that the body or that mental 
ÔrepresentationsÕ function as a screen between itself and reality (SB 186).  
 
Carrying on this spirit, the Phenomenology of Perception begins by deconstructing the 
Ôclassical prejudiceÕ of much philosophy and psychology that perceptual experience 
involves the having of sensations, where a sensation is understood as an 
Ôundifferentiated, instantaneous, and punctual ÔjoltÕÓ (PP 3). The choice of cover design 
for the once-standard English translation of Phenomenology of Perception by Colin Smith 
(Figure 1) is unfortunate in this respect. The cover shows a detail from an Ishihara 
Colour Test plate, which is suggestive of precisely the kind of atomistic theory of 
perception that Merleau-Ponty is at pains to reject. Indeed, seen in its entirety, an 
Ishihara plateÑin which differently coloured circles coalesce to present different 
numbers to people with ÔnormalÕ colour vision and those who are Ôcolour-blindÕ (Figure 
2)Ñillustrates perfectly one of the key principles of Merleau-PontyÕs theory of 
perception: that Ôa figure against a background is the most basic sensible given we can 
haveÕ (PP 4).   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cover, Phenomenology of Perception translated by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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Figure 2: Ishihara Colour Plate.  
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ishihara_9.png  
 
There is a sense in which Merleau-Ponty does not think that perceptual 
experience is entirely transparent. He is, for example, prepared to allow that 
phenomenological reflection, via the phenomenological reductionsÑand in particular the 
epoch, or Ôputting the world in bracketsÕÑÔloosens the intentional threads that connect us 
to the world in order to make them appearÕ (PP lxxvii). This reveals, amongst other 
things, essential structural properties of perceptual experience, such as its basic figure-
ground configuration, or the way that experiences of the background become 
indeterminate when we focus our attention on a figure. 
But these are not properties of experience that are anything like sensations, 
properties of a subjective visual field, or qualia. Rather, they are essential properties of 
experience, that determine, or structure, the way that objects that are independent of our 
experiences are presented. 7  Reflective awareness of experience as such is therefore 
necessarily incomplete, because our experiences are essentially experiences of the world 
that is independent of us. Merleau-PontyÕs execution of the phenomenological project 
differs importantly in this respect from HusserlÕs, at least at the time of the Cartesian 
Meditations. Husserl attempts to use the phenomenological reductions ultimately as a 
means to uncover the Ôinner manÕ, or transcendental Ego:  
 
the being of the pure ego and his cogitationes, as a being that is prior in itself, is antecendent 
to the natural being of the worldÉThe fundamental phenomenological method of 
transcendental epochÉleads back to this realm (1931: ¤8). 
 
                                                
7 Compare MartinÕs (1992) account of the visual field as that which delimits, or sets boundaries to, a region 
of physical space (see also Richardson 2010). In general, it is consistent with nave realism to allow that the 
phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least in part, by the specific way that we are 
acquainted with things in our environment. For discussion, see e.g. Logue (2012), French (2014).  
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For Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, ÔThe most important less of the reduction is the 
impossibility of a complete reductionÕ (PP lxxvii). The necessary failure of the attempt to 
carry through the epoch, and uncover a purely inner realm of subjective experience, 
shows that is that there is no Ôinner manÕ, but that we are most fundamentally beings-in-
the-world.8 
 It is controversial to what extent the (putative) phenomenological datum that 
perceptual experience is transparent supports the nave realistÕs claim that perceptual 
experience is essentially relational.9 On the one hand, it is possible to hold that although 
experience appears transparent, the appearances are misleading in this respect; this might 
be a cost of a theory of perception, but perhaps it is one that is ultimately acceptable 
given other theoretical benefits. On the other hand, as Martin (2002) argues, the 
transparency of experience may seem to be equally well explained by both nave realist 
and intentionalist theories of perception. The nave realist explains the phenomenological 
datum on the grounds that perceptual experiences are relational events, that are in part 
constituted by the things in the perceiverÕs environment that they are experiences of 
(2002: 399). The intentionalist, by contrast, explains the transparency of experience in 
terms of the way the environment is represented in experience (2002: 380-385). Unlike 
other types of representational stateÑfor instance, imagining or hopingÑperceptual  
experiences are not neutral with respect to the existence of the objects represented; as 
such, perceptual experiences have a certain kind of authority over belief, in that we tend 
to believe things are as they seem. The intentionalist can explain this feature of 
perceptual experience on the assumption that perceptual experience is a distinctive type 
of representational state that involves an assortic attitude towards the experienceÕs 
intentional content (2002: 386-392). This, in turn, provides the intentionalist with a way 
of capturing at least some of the sense of the intuitions that perceptual experiences are 
ÔimmediateÕ and ÔdirectÕ.  
Martin himself is sceptical about the prospects of adjudicating the dispute 
between nave realists and intentionalists based directly on how experience seems to us, 
because he thinks the phenomenological data will underdetermine the choice between 
nave realism and intentionalism: 
 
When we come to state the differences between the two positions, we find ourselves talking 
in terms of notions of modality and constitution. One might be sceptical whether it could 
really be part of any common sense view that objects were or were not constituents of our 
experiences of them (2002: 398). 
 
                                                
8 For discussion of Merleau-PontyÕs attitude towards the phenomenological reduction, see Joel Smith 
(2005). 
9 Indeed, it is controversial even whether it is a phenomenological datum. For some relevant discussion, 
see e.g. Crane (2000), although I will not consider this issue further here. 
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If this is right, one option for the nave realist would be to look to the epistemic 
consequences of the two views to provide a way of differentiating them (in different 
ways, see e.g. Campbell 2002, Logue 2012). Martin himself thinks that because the nave 
realist claims to be Ôdoing justice to some common sense or nave intuitionÕ about how 
experience appears, then there should be some way of settling the dispute between the 
nave realist and the intentionalist that relates to Ôan account of perceptual appearancesÕ 
(2002: 398); his way of arguing for nave realism appeals to differences between 
perception and sensory imagination that he claims the nave realist is in a better position 
to explain. Whatever the merits of these alternative ways of motivating nave realism, 
what I want to suggest in the remainder of the section is that the materials for a more 
direct adjudication of the dispute between the nave realist and the intentionalist may be 
found in Merleau-Ponty. 
In the final chapter of The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes 
common sense descriptions of perception from Ôlived perceptionÕ. According to Merleau-
Ponty, common sense descriptions of perception treat perceptual experiences as causal 
impressions (ÔtransitiveÕ effects) of distinct existences. This view, which Merleau-Ponty 
associates with the term Ônave realismÕ (see also PP 510 n. 60; PrP 38), is a product of 
what he would later describe as ÔObjective ThoughtÕ: the tendency in common sense and 
scientific thinking to abstract from lived experience and think of the world in 
determinate, causal, terms (cf. PP 73-4). From the lived perspective, Merleau-Ponty 
thinks that the things we perceive do not seem to be the causes of our experiences. 
Rather:  
 
It seems to me rather that my perception is like a beam of light which reveals the objects 
there where they are and manifests their presence, latent until then. Whether I myself 
perceive or consider another subject perceiving, it seems to me that the gaze Òis posedÓ on 
objects and reaches them from a distanceÑas is well expressed by the use of the Latin 
lumina for designating the gaze (SB 185).10 
 
There are at least two aspects to this description of the phenomenological 
character of visual experience, and they are nicely captured by C.D. BroadÕs claim that 
visual experience appears to be both ÔsaltataryÕ and ÔprehensiveÕ (1952: 5).11 On the one 
hand, visual experience is ÔsaltatoryÕ in that it Ôseems to leap the spatial gap between the 
percipientÕs body and a remote region of spaceÕÑor as Merleau-Ponty puts it, the gaze 
                                                
10 This is qualified slightly in the Phenomenology, when Merleau-Ponty asks (rhetorically) ÔShall we say that 
perception reveals objects as the lamp illuminates them at night? Must we embrace the realism that, as 
Malebranche said, imagines the soul going out through the eyes and visiting the objects in the world?Õ (PP 
251-2). But at least in part the emphasis here is on resisting Intellectualist views that attempt to dissociate 
perceptual experiences from their context: Ôsensation can no more than any other perception be separated 
from a background that is, ultimately, the worldÕ (PP 251). Hence it is not so much that Merleau-Ponty is 
resisting the view that perception is like a beam of light, but that the light is revealing objects that are 
otherwise in darkness. 
11 See also Fish (2011: 3-4) and Kalderon (2011b: 223; 2017) for further discussion of BroadÕs description. 
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Ôreaches [objects] from a distanceÕ. On the other hand, visual experience is Ôprehensive of 
the surfaces of distant bodies as coloured and extendedÕ in the sense that it seems to put 
us into a kind of contact with objectsÑor as Merleau-Ponty puts it, our gaze seems to be 
Ôposed onÕ objects. This is one of a number of tactile metaphors that Merleau-Ponty uses 
to describe perception: in perception we Ôgear intoÕ the world (e.g. PP 261) like the teeth 
in two cogs meshing together,12 we Ôcouple our body with the thingsÕ (e.g. PP 334), Ôtake 
upÕ the sensible (e.g. PP 219), get a ÔgripÕ or ÔholdÕ on things (e.g. PP 273), or investigate 
objects with Ôa palpation of the lookÕ (e.g. VI 131). But whereas Broad, a sense-datum 
theorist, thinks that these appearances are ultimately misleading, Merleau-Ponty develops 
a philosophical theory of perception that attempts to explain and articulate this aspect of 
how lived experience appears. 
These claims about the nature of perceptual experience go beyond the minimal 
claim that perceptual experience is transparent. The transparency claim is primarily a 
claim about what we are and are not aware of in perceptual experience: we are aware of 
things in our environment and not any mental objects or sensations. The claim that 
perceptual experience is ostensively saltatory and prehensive, like a beam of light that 
reveals objects in the environment, by contrast, is a claim about the way that we are aware 
of objects in experience. These are distinct claims, since there may be other ways that we 
can be aware of the very same things: for instance, perhaps sensory imagination or 
thought provide different ways of being aware of things. This claim about the way that 
things are presented in experience is suggestive of the nave realistÕs claim that perceptual 
experiences are relational events that are partly constituted by objects in our 
environment. The claim that perceptual experiences are partly constituted by external 
objects provides a straightforward explanation of the sense that perceptual experience 
puts us into a kind of contact with spatially distant objects: visual experience ostensively 
leaps out to, and grasps, objects in virtue of the fact that those objects are literally 
constituents of the experience.13  
This line of argument for nave realism raises two questions. First, should we 
accept the description of the phenomenological character of experience suggested by 
Broad and Merleau-Ponty? Second, does this provide a reason based on the way 
                                                
12 As Landes notes (PP 496, n. 47), engener (Ôto gear intoÕ) also has the sense of Ôto adjust toÕ, suggesting that 
the intermeshing of body and world isnÕt rigidly determined in advance, in the way that the meshing of 
cogs is.   
13 This thought might be at least nascent in the transparency intuition, depending on exactly how 
ÔawarenessÕ of things in our environment is understood: if it is understood in a strong, object-involving 
way, then the contact intuition might just be one way of further describing the transparency intuition. It is 
worth noting that there is a slightly different intuition that is sometimes appealed to in discussions of 
phenomenal character: that the phenomenal character of experience is Ôinherited fromÕ that which it is an 
experience of (the phrase comes from Campbell 1993; see also Shoemaker 2003, Kalderon 2011a). The 
inheritance intuition is arguably stronger than the transparency intuition (Allen 2016: 13-4), but weaker 
than the contact claim, since it doesnÕt further specify the way in which the phenomenal character is 
inherited. 
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experience appears to prefer nave realism to intentionalism? I will consider these 
questions in turn. 
 Providing a description of perceptual appearances on which everyone agrees is 
notoriously difficult. Just as the putative phenomenological datum that visual experience 
is transparent is sometimes denied, the claim that visual experience is ostensively 
saltatory and prehensive might also be resisted. So how might we argue for this claim? 
If Merleau-Ponty is right, then common sense descriptions of experience are 
liable to misrepresent the phenomena; we therefore cannot necessarily rely on the 
(typically assumed) judgments of Ôthe man on the Clapham omnibusÕ, since the mythical 
Ôcommon manÕ will normally be in the throes of ÔObjective ThoughtÕ.  
One option, following a suggestion by Fish (2009: 18-20), would be to appeal to 
the judgment of experts in phenomenological study. This strategy faces a number of 
challenges. An initial challenge is to identify the phenomenological experts in advance of 
knowing which judgments about the nature of experience are correct. Related to this, 
there is the challenge of identifying the correct method for determining the 
phenomenological character of experience in advance of knowing what experience is 
really like. These two concerns are exacerbated by the fact that amongst the class of 
people who it might be natural to describe as ÔexpertsÕ, there may be disagreement, both 
about the methods to be adopted and the results that these methods deliver. Still, it is at 
least striking that Merleau-PontyÕs description of the phenomenological character of 
experience is similar to the independent description provided by Broad, who was not 
only working in a different philosophical tradition to Merleau-Ponty, but who described 
visual perception as seemingly ÔsaltataryÕ and ÔprehensiveÕ despite being under the influence 
of Objective Thought, and so ultimately taking the appearances to be misleading in this 
respect. This convergence in judgment provides some corroboration for their 
descriptions.14 
However, rather than pursue this approach further here, I want to consider a 
different, but complementary, way of arguing for the phenomenological datum suggested 
by Merleau-Ponty. Instead of appealing to the judgments of phenomenological experts, 
an alternative is try to elicit descriptions of experience that are untainted by Objective 
Thought. Children are a potentially promising source in this respect. In considering the 
childÕs experience of the inter-subjective world, Merleau-Ponty appeals to findings by 
Piaget which suggest a description of the phenomenological character of experience that 
is similar to that which he gives in The Structure of Behaviour: 
 
The child lives in a world that he believes is immediately accessible to everyone around 
himÉFor the child, others are so many gazes inspecting things, they have an almost 
                                                
14 For a more detailed defence of phenomenological method, see ZahaviÕs (2007) response to Dennett. See 
also Siewart (2007) for the claim that we can resolve phenomenological disputes by philosophically 
enriched first-person reflection. 
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material existence, to the point that one child wonders how these gazes are not broken 
when they meet (PP 371).  
 
The view of perception that this suggests has similarities to ancient extramissionist 
theories of perception, associated with Plato, Euclid, Ptolmy, and Al-Kindi, and 
according to which vision involves some kind of output from the eye. Subsequent 
studies have since confirmed the existence of widespread broadly extramissionist 
intuitions about vision in children (e.g. Winer and Cottrell 1996). Perhaps more 
strikingly, they have also found that extramissionist intuitions can typically be elicited in 
around 50% of adultsÑincluding University students who have just taken an 
introductory course on vision science (Winer et al 2002).  
One way of testing this involves asking subjects which of a series of 
representations (typically on a computer monitor) best describes what occurs when 
people see. Subjects are presented with diagrams of the profile of a face on one side of a 
screen and a green rectangle on the other, and five possible relationships between the 
two. Dots are seen to move either from the rectangle to the eye, from the eye to the 
rectangle, from the rectangle to the eye and back, from the eye to the rectangle and back, 
or simultaneously to and from the eye. Typically around 50% of participantsÑeven 
those who had just taken the introductory course on vision scienceÑprefer one of the 
extramissionist responses, in which dots move from the eye to the object. The most 
highly favoured are those that involve simultaneous input and output, and those in which 
input to the eye is followed by output to the object. Winer et al suggest that these beliefs 
are both widespread and largely immune to training because they reflect the 
phenomenological character of visual experience: ÔVision is generally thought of as 
directed outward, away from the self, toward specific objectsÕ (2002: 423). 
 These results provide at least indirect support for the claim that visual experience 
is ostensively saltatory and prehensive, and as such appears to be constituted in part by 
its objects. These results would not naturally be taken as evidence of a constitutive view 
of perceptual experience if the output from the eye involved something like an efficient 
causal process; this would be more naturally suggestive of a variation on the view that 
Merleau-Ponty ascribes to common sense, according to which perceptual experiences are 
distinct existences from that which they are experiences of, but on which the efficient 
causal process that results in a perceptual experience requires some additional input from 
the subject. However there are reasons to resist this interpretation of the findings. In the 
case of children, for instance, an earlier researcher notes:  
 
For children the movement that goes from the eyes to the object remains abstract. It is thus 
clearly differentiated from the Òvisual fireÓ of early theories, from the ÒfluidÓ emitted by the 
eyes of witches in fairy tales or from the red rays that are beamed from SupermanÕs eyes. 
Only the idea that the subject is at the origin of a process, instead of being at the receiving 
end, is common to these various ways of portraying sight (Guesne 1985: 26). 
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Besides, thinking of that which is directed outwards in vision as being part of an efficient 
causal process isnÕt obviously consistent with the most highly favoured extramissionist 
responses, according to which there is a simultaneous input and output or views 
according to which there is an input followed by an output.  
 Assuming that the visual experience is ostensively saltatory and prehensive, the 
second question is whether this provides a reason to prefer the claim that perceptual 
experiences are essentially relational? According to non-relationalist views, perceptual 
experiences are distinct from, and merely causally responsive to, mind-independent 
objects. It may be possible for non-relationalists to explain why experiences are non-
neutral with respect to the existence of objects in the environment. As Martin (2002) 
notes, for instance, intentionalists can explain the non-neutrality of perceptual 
experiences with respect to the existence of the objects they represent in terms of the 
type of representational state they are: experiences have Ôauthority over beliefsÕ because 
they represent things in the environment as being a certain way. But it is far from clear 
that this captures the distinctive way in which objects are presented in experience: that 
non-neutrally representing the existence of objects in the environment is sufficient to 
explain the sense of contact with them that extramissionist intuitions point to.  
It might be suggested that the extramissionist intuitions are broadly consistent 
with an intentionalist theory of perception according to which experiences are distinct 
from, and caused by, external objects, but where the output from the eye is something 
like a representational or referential relation. This would fit most neatly with the scenario 
in which an input to the eye is followed by output to the object. However, it is difficult 
to see how it is consistent with the view that input and output are simultaneous, and still 
less with the pure extramissionist responses. By contrast, the nave realist theory of 
perception fits neatly with both the pure extramissionist response and the simultaneous 
input-output response. It is also consistent with the input followed by output response, if 
it is assumed (as nave realists typically do) that causal processes involving light and visual 
processing mechanisms are enabling conditions of perceptual experiences that 
constitutively depend on their objects. The nave realist theory of perception can 
therefore claim to better explain and articulate the phenomenological character of 
experience than the intentionalist: it can explain all the responses that the intentionalist 
can, plus some that the intentionalist cannot.  
Of course, the representationalist might seek to explain away this aspect of the 
phenomenological character of experience, in much the same way that the sense-datum 
theorist explains away the transparency intuition and Broad himself thought that 
perceptual experience isnÕt really saltatory and prehensive. But in so doing, this would 
involve a commitment to a theory of nature of perceptual experience according to which 
our best judgments about the nature of experience are mistaken.  
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4. HALLUCINATION 
Accounting for the phenomenology of perceptual experience is only one of the 
dimensions along which philosophical theories of perception are evaluated. As Martin 
(2002) argues, representationalist appeals to the transparency of experience can be 
understood as depending for their force on the thought that they are best able to explain 
the phenomenological character of experience in a way that is consistent with the 
possibility of illusion and hallucination: cases in which something in the environment 
looks other than it is, and cases in which it seems to the subject as if there is there is 
something in their environment that isnÕt there at all. Even if it is conceded that the nave 
realist provides a better explanation of the phenomenological character of experience 
than the intentionalist, it might still be argued that intentionalism is, on balance, a better 
theory overall, because it gives a better account of illusion and hallucination.  
A common nave realist strategy for accounting for illusion and (particularly) 
hallucination is to combine a nave realist theory of perception with a form of 
disjunctivism. According to standard forms of disjunctivism, perception (on the one 
hand) and illusion and hallucination (on the other) are essentially, or most fundamentally, 
different kinds of mental event: either S perceives, or it is merely as if S perceives.15 
Much of the contemporary literature on nave realist theories of perception has been 
concerned with the nave realistÕs commitment to a form of disjunctivism, focusing in 
particular on disjunctivist accounts of hallucination; this is because hallucinations are 
often considered to be the more difficult case for the nave realist. Again, Merleau-Ponty 
provides an interesting and distinctive perspective on this debate.  
 Merleau-Ponty accepts a form of disjunctivism (cf. Berezden 2013). For Merleau-
Ponty, perceptual experiences Ôin the full sense of the termÕ are essentially relational (¤1). 
Hallucinations differ fundamentally from veridical perceptual experiences in this respect: 
there is an Ôessential differenceÕ between perception and hallucination (PP 352), such that 
someone who is hallucinating Ôdoes not see and does not hear in the normal senseÕ (PP 
357). Specifically, whereas perception involves communion or communication Ôwith an 
insurmountable plenitudeÕ (PP 337, 354), hallucinations Ôplay out on a different stageÕ (PP 
355).16  
Much of the recent debate about disjunctivism focuses on hallucinations that are in 
principle subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences. Merleau-
PontyÕs account of hallucination, however, starts from the observation that as a matter of 
empirical fact, many actual hallucinations are subjectively discriminable from veridical 
                                                
15 Not all disjunctivists treat illusion and hallucination as fundamentally different; some subsume illusions 
under the ÔgoodÕ disjunct. See Byrne and Logue (2008) for further discussion. 
16 Merleau-Ponty makes similar remarks about illusions. For instance, of the patch of sunlight on the path 
that he sees as a stone, he says ÔI cannot say that I ever see the flat stone in the sense in which I will see the 
patch of sunlight while moving closerÕ (PP 310); this is because we do not Ôgear intoÕ illusions. However, I 
will set illusions aside here, and remain neutral on whether Merleau-PontyÕs account of hallucinations can 
be extended to account for illusions.  
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perceptual experiencesÑor at any rate, it is often possible to tell that you are perceiving 
when you are perceiving, even if it is not always possible to tell that you are hallucinating 
when you are hallucinating. Merleau-Ponty presents a number of examples from the 
psychopathological literature to illustrate the point. For instance, a schizophrenic patient 
who claims to see someone at a certain location in the garden is Ôastonished when 
someone is actually placed in the garden, at the spot indicated, in the same outfit, and 
standing with the same postureÕ. Similarly an alcoholic subject Ôwho sees the doctorÕs 
hand as a guinea pig immediately notices that a genuine pig has been placed in the other 
handÕ (PP 350).17  
According to Merleau-Ponty, we are typically able to tell when we are perceiving 
because hallucinated objects lack the Ômark of realityÕ (PP 359) characteristic of objects 
that are veridically perceived. It is as if hallucinated objects are ÔsuperimposedÕ onto the 
perceived world (PP 355). Whereas ÔThe real lends itself to an infinite exploration, it is 
inexhaustibleÕ (PP 338)Ñthat is, we can investigate real objects from different 
perspectives and in different conditionsÑthe hallucinated world Ôlacks the plenitude and 
the internal articulation that makes it the case that the real thing remains Òin itselfÓ, or 
acts and exists by itselfÕ (PP 355).  
 Of course, although it is often possible to tell that you are perceiving (and not 
hallucinating) when you are perceiving, an important part of the phenomena that needs 
accounting for is that it is nevertheless possible to be deceived by hallucinations when 
you are having them. Merleau-Ponty argues that even though hallucinations may lack the 
mark of reality, they can nevertheless have Ôthe value of realityÕ (PP 358): they can ÔsupplantÕ 
perceptions, give rise to affective responses, and motivate distinctive kinds of behaviour. 
The reason for this, according to Merleau-Ponty, is that there is a shared basis to both 
perception and hallucination. In particular, both are modalities of a Ôsingle primordial 
function by which we arrange around ourselves a milieu with a definite structureÕ, and it 
is because of this shared basis that we can be deceived when we are hallucinating: Ôthis 
fiction can only count as reality because reality itself is reached for the normal subject in an analogous 
operationÕ (PP 358). The shared basis is what Merleau-Ponty calls ÔfaithÕ, or ÔprimordialÕ or 
Ôoriginary opinionÕ: Ôthe movement that carries us beyond subjectivity, that places us in 
the world prior to every science and every verificationÉÑor that, on the contrary, 
becomes bogged down in our private appearancesÕ (PP 359). This shared basis to 
perception and hallucination is grounded in the fact that we are embodied subjects with 
sensory fields that give us access to a transcendent world. 
  On Merleau-PontyÕs account, hallucination isÑor at least, is likeÑa form of 
sensory imagination: the type of perception-like mental event that involves thinking 
about how things look, sound, taste, or smell, as when we visualise an apple or Ôpicture 
                                                
17 Merleau-PontyÕs focus on actual cases of hallucination is something stressed by Romdehn-Romluc 
(2009). 
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with the mindÕs earÕ the peal of church bells. Whereas perception involves Ôgearing intoÕ 
the world via the body, we do not Ôgear intoÕ the world in imagination. When we 
sensorily imagine something, the world does not provide the same kind of friction or 
resistance that it provides when we perceive: ÔImagination is without depth; it does not 
respond to our attempts to vary our points of view; it does not lend itself to our 
observationÕ (PP 338).18 Hallucination is like imagination in this respect. Someone who 
hallucinates is not Ôgeared intoÕ the world, but instead Ôfabricate[s] for himself, with the 
debris of this world, an artificial milieu conforming to the total intention of his beingÕ 
(PP 357). Hallucinated objects are not part of the inter-subjectively accessible world, and 
as such lack the ÔdepthÕ that is characteristic of real objects: ÔThe hallucinatory thing is 
not like the real thing, packed with little perceptions that sustain it in existenceÕ, and it is 
for this reason that it is as if ÔThe hallucination is not in the world, but rather Òin front 
ofÓ itÕ (PP 355). Both imagination and hallucination nevertheless presuppose our being-
in-the-world. It is only because we are bodily subjects with sensory fields who are 
embedded within the world that hallucination and imagination are possible:  
 
The world remains the vague place of all our experiences. It accommodates, pell-mell, true 
objects as well as individual and fleeting fantasiesÑbecause it is an individual that 
encompasses everything and not a collection of objects linked together through causal 
relations. To have hallucinations and, in general, to imagine is to exploit this tolerance of the 
pre-predicative world as well as our vertiginous proximity to all being in syncretic experience 
(PP 359). 
 
 The view that hallucination is, or is like, a form of sensory imaginationÑ
typically, a form of sensory imagination over which subjects lack direct voluntary 
controlÑis popular in the psychopathological literature (e.g. Bentall 1990; cf. Allen 
2015). At least in part this is because it provides a compelling account of a broad range 
of empirical cases, like those Merleau-Ponty considers, in which the phenomenal 
character of hallucination is more like that of an episode of sensory imagining than a 
perceptual experience, and so which are subjectively discriminable from veridical 
perceptual experiences.  
The general view that hallucination is, or is like, a form of sensory imagination 
does not of itself entail a disjunctivist theory of perception. It is possible, for instance, to 
hold that there is common element to perception and imaginationÑthe having of an 
image, or the tokening of a representational contentÑand that the difference between 
the two is solely a difference in the extrinsic causal relations that this common element 
stands in. This would be an Empiricist account of hallucination, that Merleau-Ponty 
                                                
18 Merleau-Ponty does not discuss imagination in much detail, though it is clear from what he does say that 
his view of the imagination is at least broadly similar to the view that Sartre presents in more detail in The 
Imaginary (1940). 
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would dismiss on the grounds that it cannot account of the subjective discriminability of 
actual hallucinations; attending to the empirical details, Merleau-Ponty thinks, shows that 
Ôhallucination is not a sensory contentÕ (PP 350).  
But even if the view that hallucination is, or is like, a form of sensory imagination 
does not entail a disjunctivist theory of perception, it represents a promising account of 
hallucination from the disjunctivist perspective.19 Contemporary disjunctivists often give 
negative, relational, characterisations of hallucination, as mental events that are 
subjectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptual experiences. According to Martin 
(2004), for instance, there is nothing more to the phenomenal character of an 
hallucination than its being subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical perceptual 
experience. According to Fish (2009), hallucinations lack phenomenal character 
altogether, and hallucinating subjects merely form mistaken higher-order beliefs about 
the phenomenal character of hallucinations. (Martin and Fish focus primarily on Ôcausally 
matchingÕ hallucinations that are in principle indistinguishable; more on these below.) 
But negative, relational, characterisations of hallucination are liable to seem dissatisfying; 
it is tempting to agree with Dancy (1995) that a more direct characterisation of 
hallucination in mental terms ought to be possible. The view that hallucination is, or is 
like, a form of imagination provides a way for the disjunctivist to give a positive account 
of the negative disjunct, and thereby satisfy this desire for further explanation.  
By identifying hallucinations with episodes of sensory imaginingÑperception-like 
episodes with phenomenal characterÑthe disjunctivist can provide an account of why 
hallucinations are not distinguished from veridical perceptual experience in cases in 
which they are not, without seemingly taking subjective indiscriminability for granted 
(compare SiegelÕs 2008 objection to Martin 2004). Nor does this form of disjunctivism 
reduce hallucination to false judgment (like Fish 2009). From Merleau-PontyÕs 
perspective, this kind of Intellectualist account of hallucination also falsifies the 
phenomena. People who hallucinate do not, Merleau-Ponty claims, typically believe or 
judge that they are perceiving: 
 
madmen do not believe they see or, so long as they are questioned, they correct their 
declarations on this point. The hallucination is not a rash judgment or belief for the same 
reasons that prevent it from being a sensory content: judgment or belief could only consist 
in positing the hallucination as true, and this is precisely what the patients do not do. On the 
level of judgment, patients distinguish between hallucination and perception (PP 350-1). 
 
The underlying problem with Intellectualist accounts of hallucinationÑa problem which 
Intellectualist accounts share with Empiricist accounts, because both are expressions of 
ÔObjective ThoughtÕÑis that they fail to appreciate the hallucinationÕs Ôown mode of 
                                                
19 See Allen (2015) for further discussion and defence. For the claim that hallucination is a distinctive mode 
of consciousness (and so which at least has affinities to the view that hallucination is like sensory 
imagination), see Campbell (2014: 90-4) and Ivanov (ms.)  
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certainty and its immanent senseÕ (PP 351). That is, they fail to account for the distinctive 
phenomenal character of actual hallucinations. 
It might be suggested that Merleau-PontyÕs account of hallucination faces a 
version of the Ôscreening offÕ objection that is often leveled against contemporary forms 
of disjunctivism (cf. Martin 2004). According to the Ôscreening offÕ objection, if whatever 
occurs when we hallucinate also occurs when we veridically perceive, then the common 
element to hallucination and perception threatens to Ôscreen offÕ from the explanation of 
the phenomenal character of veridical perceptual experience whatever is unique to the 
good case; in particular, it threatens to render irrelevant to the explanation of the 
phenomenal character of experience the subjectÕs relationship to mind-independent 
objects, properties, and relations in the world. Assuming that there is a common element 
to hallucination and perception that is sufficient to account for the phenomenal character 
of experience, then this would establish the Ôcommon kind assumptionÕ: that 
hallucination and perception are fundamentally the same kind of mental event, contrary 
to claim of the disjunctivist. Applying this line of reasoning in Merleau-PontyÕs case, even 
though perception (Ôin the full senseÕ) and hallucination differ essentially, both are the 
result of the Ôsingle primordial functionÕ by virtue of which we arrange around ourselves 
a milieu. It might be suggested that this common function Ôscreens offÕ openness to the 
world in the explanation of the phenomenal character of veridical perceptual experience. 
But it is not clear that the common function underlying perception and 
hallucination is best thought of as a common element to perception and hallucination. 
Instead, it can be thought ofÑconsistent with Merleau-PontyÕs claim that perception and 
hallucination differ essentiallyÑas an enabling condition for perception and hallucination. 
It is in virtue of this primordial function that perception and hallucination are possible, 
but of itself this primordial function is not sufficient to explain the phenomenal character 
of a veridical perceptual experience. The single primordial function partly determines the 
nature of the world that is available to the subject. As Merleau-Ponty says in explaining 
his hesitation to describe what he earlier calls the Ôintentional arcÕ underpinning 
conscious life in terms of a searchlight:  
 
the comparison to a searchlight is not a good one, since it takes for granted the given 
objects upon which intelligence projects its light, whereas the core function we are speaking 
of hereÑprior to making us see or know objectsÑfirst more secretly brings them into 
existence for us (PP 137). 
 
But the operation of this primordial function is not of itself sufficient to determine the 
phenomenal character of a particular veridical perceptual experience. This is determined, 
at least in part, by the operation of the gaze; and this, in turn, depends on whether the 
world affords exploration by the gaze. 
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A second version of the Ôscreening offÕ objection is that if hallucination also 
involves taking the world to be a certain way, then this represents a common element to 
perception and hallucination that threatens to Ôscreen offÕ whatever else is uniquely true 
of veridical perceptual experience. But this does not provide a common element to 
perception and hallucination that is sufficient to explain the phenomenal character of 
experience, either. For Merleau-Ponty there is always a phenomenally discernible 
difference between hallucination and perception, and this is because perception involves 
Ôcommerce with a harsh, resistant, and intractable worldÕ (PP 358) in a way that 
hallucination does not. Openness to a transcendent world is necessary for the distinctive 
kind of contact or communion with an insurmountable plenitude that veridical 
perceptual experience involves. 
 A third objection, following on from this, is that Merleau-PontyÕs account 
doesnÕt address the types of hallucinations that are most commonly discussed in the 
philosophical literature: hallucinations that are in principle indistinguishable from 
veridical perceptual experiences, because their proximate causes in the brain are identical 
to those of corresponding veridical perceptual experiences. Suppose, for instance, that a 
device could be fitted to the optic nerve that exactly reproduces the signal that would be 
received from the retina if the world were a certain way that it is not. Would the 
experiences caused by this device be of the same fundamental kind as those the subject 
would enjoy were they caused by the scene in front of them? Or to take a more extreme 
case, if it were possible to stimulate an evatted brain in the appropriate ways, would they 
have experiences of the same fundamental kind as a normal embodied subject embedded 
within the world? 
These purely hypothetical cases of Ôcausally-matchingÕ hallucination are central to 
presentations of the causal argument from hallucination in contemporary Anglophone 
philosophy of perception. The argument starts from the claim that the proximate causal 
conditions in the brain are sufficient for (or fix the chances of) the occurrence of a 
veridical perceptual experience, even if the candidate object of perception is not present. 
Given the principle same proximate cause, same immediate effect, it follows that whatever 
would happen when we hallucinate in these circumstances would also happen when we 
veridically perceive. Assuming, in turn, that this common effect would Ôscreen offÕ 
whatever is true just of the case in which we veridically perceive, then a subjectÕs 
openness to the world is rendered irrelevant to the explanation of the phenomenal 
character of their experience; and this would establish the common kind assumption. 
 This strengthened version of the causal argument attempts to block the Merleau-
Pontian account by envisaging a situation in which the proximate causes of perceptual 
experience in the brain generate experiences that are indistinguishable in every respect 
from a veridical perceptual experience. The envisaged situation, however, is one whose 
possibility Merleau-Ponty would deny. The causal argument from hallucination depends 
on the principle that Martin calls ÔExperiential NaturalismÕ: that perceptual experiences 
 25 
are Ôthemselves part of the natural causal order, subject to broadly physical and 
psychological causesÕ (Martin 2006: 357). This principle is one that Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly rejects; as he says in criticising Empiricist views of hallucination, for instance, 
we cannot assume that Ôthrough the effect of certain physiological causes, such as the 
irritation of the nervous centres, sensible givens would appear as they appear in 
perception, through the action of physical stimuli upon the same nervous centresÕ (PP 
351). For Merleau-Ponty, perceptual experiences do not supervene locally on a subjectÕs 
brain state, or even the state of their central nervous system more generally. The 
character of perceptual experience depends instead on the nature of the subjectÕs entire 
body and the environment in which they are embedded. The physical events that take 
place in the brain and central nervous system are at best enabling conditions of 
perceptual experience; they make perceptual experience of the subjectÕs environment 
possible, without determining the nature of that experience. As Merleau-Ponty says in 
the Structure of Behaviour, we cannot understand the Ôsum of the nerve events which are 
produced in each point of the cortexÕ as the cause of experience, since ÔThis whole can 
be only the condition of existence of such and such a sensible scene; it accounts for the fact 
that I perceive but not for that which I perceiveÕ (SB 206). That is, activity in the brain and 
central nervous system can explain the occurrence of perceptual experiences, but we 
need to advert to things in the subjectÕs environment to understand what those 
experiences are experiences of. 
 Merleau-PontyÕs rejection of Experiential Naturalism may be a manifestation of a 
more broadly idealistic outlook; I will return to this below (see ¤5). Many contemporary 
nave realists would be reluctant to follow Merleau-Ponty in this direction. As Martin 
explains, Experiential Naturalism is a widely accepted Ômethodological or regulative 
assumption of both empirical work on sense experience and philosophical discussion of 
itÕ (Martin 2006: n.8); it does not of itself involve a commitment to any form of reductive 
physicalism, just to the much more minimal claim that experiences do not stand outside 
of the causal order. Whether nave realists should accept Experiential Naturalism 
warrants further discussion, but I will set this aside here.20 For those nave realists who 
would not want to follow Merleau-Ponty in rejecting Experiential Naturalism, it is worth 
noting that the rejection of Experiential Naturalism is independent of Merleau-PontyÕs 
claim that physical activity in the brain and central nervous system is an enabling 
condition of veridical perceptual experience. It is possible to accept both Experiential 
Naturalism and the claim that processing in the brain and central nervous system is an 
enabling condition of veridical perceptual experience, if perceptual processing is an 
enabling condition of an essentially relational experience that is caused by the worldly 
state of affairs that partly constitutes it (e.g. Kalderon 2011). Moreover, Experiential 
                                                
20 Experiential Naturalism is often rejected by opponents of the Causal Theory of Perception with 
Wittgensteinian sympathies (e.g. White 1961). It is rejected in a different way by Stoneham (2008), who 
denies that there are experiences at all. For further discussion, see Allen (2016: Chapter 5).  
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Naturalism can be accepted consistently with the view that hallucination is a form of 
sensory imagination if, in response to the causal argument from hallucination, the 
principle same proximate cause, same immediate effect does not hold where there are additional 
conditions necessary for the occurrence of certain kinds of mental events: in the case of 
perception, the presence of a mind-independent object; and in the case of imagination 
and hallucination, the absence of a mind-independent object (for further discussion, see 
Author).  
   
5. REALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL NAìVE REALISM 
I have argued so far that Merleau-Ponty accepts interesting and distinctive versions of a 
number of the key theoretical commitments of contemporary nave realist theories of 
perception. I want to conclude by pointing to one way in which Merleau-PontyÕs theory 
of perception may differ importantly from the nave realistÕs, and by highlighting a 
further possible meta-philosophical difference between Merleau-PontyÕs approach and 
that of contemporary nave realists that opens up an avenue for further exploration. 
Merleau-PontyÕs denial of Experiential Naturalism may be symptomatic of a 
broader contrast between his approach and that of many contemporary nave realists: 
Merleau-PontyÕs approach, at least in Phenomenology of Perception, appears to be broadly 
idealistic in a way contemporary forms of nave realism tend not to be. This may in turn 
related, at least contingently, to the particular meta-philosophical attitude that Merleau-
Ponty adopts towards his theory of perception: to the extent that he accepts a nave 
realist theory of perception, Merleau-PontyÕs view can be described as accepting a form 
of transcendental nave realism. 
Merleau-Ponty is working in the post-Kantian tradition, and like Husserl before 
him, he sees phenomenology as a form of transcendental enquiry. This involves, at a 
minimum, identifying transcendental conditions that provide Ôhow possibleÕ explanations 
of phenomena like our experience of the world; as Merleau-Ponty says on the very first 
page of the Preface to Phenomenology, phenomenology is Ôa transcendental philosophy that 
suspends the affirmations of the natural attitude in order to understand themÕ (PP lxx). 
For Merleau-Ponty, the lived-body represents a transcendental condition of perception; 
this is why he says in the Introduction to Part Two of the Phenomenology of Perception that 
ÔThe theory of the body is already a theory of perceptionÕ (PP 209). The lived-body plays 
a role roughly analogous to KantÕs transcendental Ego. For Kant, the objective character 
of perceptionÑthe fact that it is experience of an independent worldÑis possible in 
virtue of the unity of the transcendental subject and its capacity to order representations 
using a priori concepts of the understanding. For Merleau-Ponty, the lived-body plays a 
broadly similar explanatory role: the body Ôis in the world just as the heart is in the 
organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible spectacle, animates it and 
nourishes it from within, and forms a system with itÕ (PP 209), and perception of an 
independent world is possible because the unity of the object is experienced as Ôthe 
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correlate of the unity of our bodyÕ (PP 210). Merleau-Ponty rejects the existence of 
KantÕs transcendental Ego, and correspondingly the Kantian world of things-in-
themselves; but he appears to retain something of KantÕs idealism about the perceived 
world.21  
Merleau-Ponty insists that things in the world transcend particular experiences of 
them. Given its embodied basis, perceptual experience necessarily provides us with only 
a perspectival, indeterminate, and ambiguous hold on an ÔinexhaustibleÕ world that lends 
itself Ôto an infinite explorationÕ (PP 338).22 Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty thinks that we 
cannot make sense of things independent of all possible experience of them. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the world is transcendent, but not what might be called strongly mind-
independent. This, for instance, is the grain of truth that Merleau-Ponty thinks is 
contained within BerkeleyÕs ÔMaster ArgumentÕ for (subjective) idealism:  
 
The thing can never be separated from someone who perceives it; nor can it ever actually be 
in itself because its articulations are the very ones of our existence, and because it is posited 
at the end of a gaze or at the conclusion of a sensory exploration that invests it with 
humanity (PP 334).  
 
It is not just that the perceived world is primary in the epistemological sense that our 
knowledge of it comes, in the first instance, through perception. Merleau-Ponty seems to 
suggest, moreover, that the perceived world enjoys a kind of metaphysical primacy: 
 
To return to the things themselves is to return to this world prior to knowledge, this world 
of which knowledge always speaks, and this world with regard to which every scientific 
determination is abstract, signitive, and dependent (PP lxxii).23 
 
This is not to say that for Merleau-Ponty there are two worlds, the phenomenal and the 
objective, such that the latter depends metaphysically upon the former. Nor is Merleau-
Ponty best understood as claiming that the Ôobjective worldÕ is unreal (cf. PrP 35). But he 
at least seems to think that scientific descriptions of the world are abstractions from lived 
experience, that necessarily distort its lived character (cf. Dillon 1997: 86-93).  
 To the extent that Merleau-PontyÕs view in the Phenomenology is a form of 
idealism, Merleau-Ponty cannot naturally be described as accepting a nave realist theory 
                                                
21 For further discussion of similarities between Merleau-Ponty and Kant, see e.g. Gardner (2015) and 
Maherne (2016). 
22 Compare Merleau-PontyÕs discussion of his experience of his neighbourÕs house, which tries to steer a 
course between thinking of the house as being Ôthe house seen from nowhereÕ and the fact that perception 
is perspectival. As Merleau-Ponty says, foreshadowing his subsequent development of this point, the 
challenge is Ôto understand how vision can come about from somewhere without thereby being locked 
within its perspectiveÕ (PP 69). For insightful discussion, see Matherne (forthcoming). 
23 See also Merleau-PontyÕs claim that Ôthe bodyÑas a chemical structure or a collection of tissuesÑis 
formed through a process of impoverishment beginning from a primordial phenomenon of the body-for-
usÕ (PP 367). 
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of perception; at best he may be said to share some of the nave realistÕs core theoretical 
commitments. It is controversial, however, whether Merleau-PontyÕs view in the 
Phenomenology really isÑor at any rate, ought to beÑa form of idealism.24  Commenting 
on the Phenomenology, Beaufret, for example, claims that Merleau-PontyÕs main problem is 
that he has not been Ôsufficiently radicalÕ, because (following Husserl) his 
phenomenological descriptions Ôretain the vocabulary of idealismÕ, even if 
phenomenology itself, when fully developed, may require Ôthe abandonment of 
subjectivity and the vocabulary of subjective idealismÕ (PrP 41-2). Certainly the 
intimation of idealism in the Phenomenology seems to be something that Merleau-Ponty 
himself became dissatisfied with. As he says in working notes for the later (posthumously 
published) work The Visible and the Invisible, if we accept the view of the relationship 
between the phenomenal and the objective suggested in the Phenomenology, then we 
cannot understand how facts about the ÔobjectiveÕ bodyÑfor instance, cerebral lesions, 
like that suffered by SchneiderÑcan dramatically affect the ÔphenomenalÕ body and its 
relation to the world. According to Merleau-Ponty, this problem is symptomatic of the 
fact that in the Phenomenology he starts from the ÔconsciousnessÕ-ÔobjectÕ distinction, 
rendering the problems he considers there ÔinsolubleÕ (July 1959, VI 200). Because the 
distinction is so heavily embedded within the PhenomenologyÑin its structure, argument, 
and languageÑMerleau-Ponty is ultimately unable to escape the dualistic framework that 
he attempts to overcome (cf. Barbaras 2004: 3-19). He tries to address this problem in 
his later work through the introduction of the ÔfleshÕ, the ÔelementÕ or Ôincarnate 
principleÕ of which everything partakes (VI 139), and by reconceiving of the phenomenal 
and the objective not as two ÔsidesÕ, ÔleavesÕ or ÔlayersÕ, but as intertwined, like the 
obverse and reverse or like two segments of a circle (VI 137-8). 
To what extent Merleau-PontyÕs attempt to overcome the problems that arise for 
the Phenomenology is not something I will consider here; nor will I consider the related 
question of to what extent Merleau-PontyÕs later work differs substantively from his 
earlier work.25 Instead, I want to close by briefly highlighting an avenue for further 
exploration that the consideration of Merleau-PontyÕs theory of perception helps to 
disclose: the possibility of understanding the nave realist theory of perception as a 
transcendental theory of perception. 
Contemporary nave realist theories of perception are often presented as one 
philosophical theory of perception amongst others, to be defended by inference to the 
best explanation, and to be assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs 
performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to 
appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. On this view, 
                                                
24  And insofar as Merleau-Ponty is an idealist, it is also controversial whether this is necessarily 
problematic. Compare, for example, PihlstrmÕs description of the Ôidealist objectionÕ to the use of 
transcendental arguments as an oxymoron (2004: 310, n. 12). 
25 See e.g. Dillon 1988: 85 (and following) for some discussion. 
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naive realism is a philosophical theory of the same basic kind as, and in direct 
competition with, intentionalist and sense-datum theories. Compared to these 
alternatives, nave realism is generally considered to be the philosophical theory of 
perception that best articulates the phenomenological character of experience. But one of 
the pressing challenges for the nave realist at this point is to explain why fidelity to the 
appearances should be accorded any particular privilege in deciding between competing 
philosophical theories of perception. At best, it might be suggested that respecting the 
appearances is one consideration amongst many, that provides a defeasible reason for 
accepting a philosophical theory of perception, but which can be outweighed by 
theoretical costs or benefits elsewhere; at worst it might be suggested that respecting the 
appearances is not a relevant consideration at all, any more than it would be if we were 
trying to explain why people believe in ghosts.26  
When viewed from a transcendental perspective, however, the nave realist 
theory of perception takes on a different cast. Like nave realism, transcendental nave 
realism is a philosophical theory of perception: the transcendental attitude is not 
supposed to be an attitude that we ordinarily or navely adopt, but is a distinctive meta-
philosophical attitude that we can adopt towards a philosophical theory like nave 
realism. Broadly speaking, the transcendental nave realist will not see nave realism 
simply as one philosophical theory of perception among others. Rather they will see it as 
having a special status amongst philosophical theories of perception; indeed they are 
likely to see it as being, in some sense, immune to falsification. Viewed from the 
transcendental perspective, nave realism is part of the transcendental project of 
explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics 
that it does. Although there are different ways of understanding of exactly what this 
involves, it is likely to involve some, or all, of the following: using transcendental 
arguments, identifying transcendental conditions for the possibility of perceptual 
experience having the distinctive characteristics that it does, and according an essential 
role to subjects and subjectivity.27  
Merleau-PontyÕs discussion of perception suggests one form that a 
transcendental nave realist theory of perception can take. Rather than seeing the nave 
realist theory of perception as that which provides the best explanation of the 
                                                
26 For a version of this kind of objection, see e.g. Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006: 180).  
27  For further discussion of what, if anything, is common to all manifestations of transcendental 
philosophy, see e.g. Philstrm (2004). Note that Merleau-Ponty himself diverges fromÑor as he sees it, 
develops to its logical conclusionÑthe Kantian view that transcendental philosophy involves identifying a 
priori transcendental conditions insofar as he thinks it is necessary to reinterpret the traditional notion of 
the a priori. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no distinction in kind between the a priori and the a posteriori: they 
are Ôtruths on the same levelÕ, and differ to the extent that ÔThe a priori is the fact as understood, made 
explicit, and followed through into all of the consequences of its tacit logic; the a posteriori is the isolated 
and implicit factÕ (PP 230). Nor does transcendental philosophy for Merleau-Ponty involve identifying 
necessary conditions as these are normally understood, either: ÔHuman existence will lead us to revisit our 
usual notion of necessity and contingency, because human existence is the change of contingency into 
necessity through the act of taking upÕ (PP 174). 
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phenomenological character of experience, for example, a transcendental nave realist can 
use the phenomenological character of experience as a premiss in a transcendental 
argument for nave realism: perceptual experience puts us into contact with our 
environment, and it is a condition of the possibility of perceptual experience putting us 
into contact with our environment that perceptual experience is essentially relational. It is 
not just that this aspect of the phenomenological character of experience is best explained 
by the nave realist theory of perception; it would not be possible if nave realism were 
false.28  
In turn, a transcendental nave realist can follow Merleau-Ponty in arguing that 
the possibility of perceptual experience being essentially relational is itself grounded in 
the distinctive nature of perceiving subjects: that it is a condition of the possibility of 
being consciously acquainted with objects in our environment that we are ourselves 
embodied subjects, embedded in the world. Were we not bodily subjects who are Ôin and 
toward the worldÕ (PP 103), then we could not be consciously acquainted with things in 
our environment.  
This sketch of a transcendental nave realist theory of perception requires further 
elaboration and defence. One of the central challenges is whether it is possible to divorce 
nave realism understood as a transcendental theory of perception from a broadly 
idealistic framework, whilst at the same time guaranteeing that there is an interesting 
sense in which nave realism is immune to falsification. Indeed, given that dissociating 
transcendental approaches to philosophical problems from transcendental idealism is one 
of the key problematics of the neo-Kantian Oxford Realism out of which contemporary 
nave realist theories of perception developed, it is an interesting question whether, and 
to what extent, some contemporary defences of nave realism can already be understood 
as defences of forms of transcendental nave realism. I will not pursue these questions 
further here.29 But I hope at least that the discussion of Merleau-PontyÕs theory of 
perception serves to bring into focus the possibility of a transcendental nave realism, 
according to which the nave realist theory of perception is a manifestation of our being-
in-the-world.30 
                                                
28 Other arguments for nave realism can also be cast as transcendental arguments: for instance, perhaps 
conscious acquaintance with our environment is a condition of the possibility of demonstrative reference 
to objects (cf. Campbell 2002), knowledge of what objects are like (cf. Logue 2012), or (combining a nave 
realist theory of perception with a nave realist theory of colour) the qualitative character of conscious 
experience (cf. Fish 2009, Kalderon 2011, Allen 2016).  
29 Dissociating transcendental philosophy from transcendental idealism is a key theme in the work of 
Strawson. I develop and discuss a form of transcendental nave realism from a Strawsonian perspective in 
work in preparation. The idea that a relational (but not nave realist) theory of perception can be 
established by transcendental argument is defended by McDowell (2008), and it is possible to interpret 
Campbell (2002) as presenting a transcendental argument for nave realism in claiming that only nave 
realism is able to explain the possibility of demonstrative reference to objects. 
30 Earlier versions of the paper were presented in York, Glasgow, Dubrovnik, and at a meeting of SPIN in 
Leeds. I am very grateful to the audiences on these occasions for their questions and comments. I would 
also like to thank three anonymous referees for PhilosophersÕ Imprint, Will Hornett, and Joel Smith for 
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